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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. First Amendment and "Fighting Words"
Minnesota's harassment and stalking crimes statute violates the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution.' In State v.
Machholz,' the Minnesota Supreme Court held that Minnesota Stat-
utes section 609.749, subdivisions 1(1) and 2(7) 3 are invalid be-
cause they are impermissibly vague and reach a wide range of con-
stitutionally protected activity.
4
On October 11, 1995, Kurtis Dean Machholz rode his horse
through a crowd that gathered in downtown Rochester, Minnesota,
to celebrate "National Coming Out Day," an annual event for ho-
mosexuals, their families and friends. Machholz rode through the
crowd shouting: "'You're giving us AIDS'; 'You're spreading your
filth!'; 'There are no homosexuals in heaven!'; and 'You're corrupt-
ing our children!'" 6 At one point, Machholz swung the horse's lead
rope and knocked down an easel holding a sign announcing the
celebration.7 While there were no allegations that Machholz actu-
ally struck anyone, several peolle did claim to feel "threatened"
and "frightened" by his conduct.
Machholz was charged with a felony violation of Minnesota
Statutes section 609.749, subdivisions 1(1), 2(7) and 3(1), which
criminalizes any "harassing conduct that interferes with another
person or intrudes on the person's privacy or liberty" on the basis
of the victim's "actual or perceived ... sexual orientation." The
1. See State v. Machholz, 574 N.W.2d 415, 417-18 (Minn. 1998). See also U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
2. 574 N.W.2d 415 (Minn. 1998).
3. MINN. STAT. § 609.749, subds. 1(1) & 2(7) (1998). The court noted that
subdivision 1(1), which defines the term "harassment," is only overbroad when
read in conjunction with subdivision 2(7) which criminalizes "any other harassing
conduct." See Machholz, 574 N.W.2d at 417 n.1.
4. See id. at 417.
5. See id. at 417-18.
6. Id. at 418.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See MINN. STAT. § 609.749 (1998). The statute provides:
1065
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statute defines "harass" as intentional conduct which the "actor
knows or has reason to know would cause the victim under the cir-
cumstances to feel frightened, threatened, oppressed, persecuted,
or intimidated."'1
At pre-trial, the district court dismissed all charges against
Machholz, holding that the statute was impermissibly vague and
overbroad and therefore invalid under the First Amendment to theS • 11
United States Constitution. The court of appeals, however, re-versed, finding that the language of the statute was "virtually
Subdivision 1. Definition. As used in this section, "harass" means to en-
gage in intentional conduct which: (1) the actor knows or has reason to
know would cause the victim under the circumstances to feel frightened,
threatened, oppressed, persecuted, or intimidated; and (2) causes this
reaction on the part of the victim ....
Subdivision. 2. Harassment and stalking crimes. (a) A person who har-
asses another by committing any of the following acts is guilty of a gross
misdemeanor: (1) directly or indirectly manifests a purpose or intent to
injure the person, property, or rights of another by the commission of an
unlawful act; (2) stalks, follows, or pursues another; (3) returns to the
property of another if the actor is without claim of right to the property
or consent of one with authority to consent; (4) repeatedly makes tele-
phone calls, or induces a victim to make telephone calls to the actor,
whether or not conversation ensues; (5) makes or causes the telephone
of another repeatedly or continuously to ring; (6) repeatedly mails or de-
livers or causes the delivery of letters, telegrams, messages, packages, or
other objects; or (7) engages in any other harassing conduct that interferes
with another person or intrudes on the person's privacy or liberty ....
Subdivision 3. Aggravated violations. A person who commits any of the
following acts is guilty of a felony: (1) commits any offense described in
subdivision 2 because of the victim's or another's actual or perceived
race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, disability as defined in sec-
tion 363.01, age, or national origin ....
Id. (emphasis added).
10. Id. The definition of "harass" also includes a victim who actually feels
frightened, threatened, oppressed, persecuted, or intimidated. See id. at subd.
1(1).
11. See Machholz, 574 N.W.2d at 417. See also U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads as follows:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
equivalent to the 'fighting words' category of unprotected speech"'
2
as articulated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.
Writing for the court, Justice Page rejected the State's assertion
that the statute could be narrowly applied only to "fighting
words.' 14 Rather, the broad reach of the statute would criminalize
numerous forms of constitutionally protected speech.' 5 For exam-
ple, a neo-nazi march through a residential community of Holo-• 16 •• •1
caust survivors, or burning a cross at a political rally" or on the
lawn of a black family in the middle of the night 8 could certainly
intrude upon an individual's liberty or privacy and would undoubt-
edly cause feelings of fear, oppression or intimidation on the part
of the victims.19 While it is established that the U.S. Supreme Court
considers these activities to be constitutionally protected forms of
speech,° the conduct would nonetheless be criminally punishable
21under the Minnesota statute.
Furthermore, the court posited that any number of benign
daily interactions would likewise fall within the reach of the statute,
such as a supervisor who forcefully chastises a consistently tardy
employee, or a basketball coach who yells at his team for its unin-
spired performance, or the law professor who ridicules the unpre-
22pared first-year student. The court observed that while these ac-
tivities are clearly forms of speech protected by the First
Amendment, the supervisor, coach and law professor could all po-
tentially be criminally prosecuted under the State's expansive read-.... 23
ing of subdivision 2 (7) . Thus, considering the broad reach of the
statute and the fact that it is not susceptible to a limited applica-
tion, the statute is impermissibly and unconstitutionally overbroad
on its face.24
12. See State v. Machholz, 561 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
13. 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (defining "fighting words" as those "which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace").
14. See Machholz, 574 N.W.2d at 420.
15. See id.
16. See Nationalist Socialist Party of Am. v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 50 (1977).
17. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 451 (1969).
18. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 384 (1992).
19. See Machholz, 574 N.W.2d at 420.
20. See id.; see also RA.V., 505 U.S. at 384; Skokie, 432 U.S. at 50; Brandenburg,
395 U.S. at 451.
21. See Machholz, 574 N.W.2d at 420.
22. See id. at 420-21.
23. See id. at 421.
24. See id.
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Noting that Machholz's actions and speech together are con-
stitutionally protected forms of expressive activity, the court ruled
that the statute is also unconstitutional as applied. Machholz's ac-
tivity did not constitute "fighting words," a form of speech not pro-
tected under the First Amendment. 26 In so holding, the court ap-
plied the test articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Chaplinsky
and its progeny defining "fighting words" as those "which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach
of the peace."27 The danger produced by the words must rise "far
above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest" to fall outside
the protective parameters of the First Amendment. Conceding
that Machholz's statements were "offensive and obnoxious," the
court held that they did not "incite an immediate breach of the
peace" or "produce a clear and present danger of a serious substan-
tial evil."2
Machholz's statements were made in a public place, aimed at
no particular individual and expressed a personal viewpoint on a
particular lifestyle.30 This, the court reiterated, is "a classic form of
speech that lies at the heart of the First Amendment, and speech in
public arenas is at its most protected on public sidewalks, a proto-
typical example of a traditional public forum."
3
1
B. Federal Subsidies and the First Amendment
The United States Government may establish subjective, view-
point based criteria on applications for federal subsidies of the32 33
arts. In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, the Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether a 1990 amendment to the Na-
tional Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1 9 6 5 34
25. See id.
26. See id.; see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
27. Id.
28. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 9 (1949); see also R1A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 414 (1992) (White, J. concurring) (noting that "the mere fact
that expressive activity causes hurt feelings, offense, or resentment does not ren-
der the expression unprotected").
29. Machhol.z, 574 N.W.2d at 422 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 574 (1942) and Terminiello v. Chicago, 377 U.S. 1, 9 (1949)).
30. See id.
31. Id. (quoting Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 360 (1997)).
32. See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2179
(1998).
33. 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998).
34. 20 U.S.C.A. § 954(d) (1) (West Supp. 1998).
1068 [Vol. 25
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violated artists' First Amendment rights by requiring the Chairper-
son of the National Endowment for the Arts ("NEA") to ensure that
"artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which ap-
plications are judged, taking into consideration general standards
of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the
American public.""' Rejecting assertions that the amendment pro-
vided for viewpoint-based discrimination, the Court upheld the
statute's constitutionality because it did not "rais[e] concem[s]
about the suppression of disfavored viewpoints ... " 
"6
In June of 1990, performance artists Karen Finley, John Fleck,
Holly Hughes, and Tim Miller were advised by the NEA that their
application for a federal grant had been denied.37 The artists filed
suit in United States District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornias arguing that the NEA statute violated their First Amend-
ment rights because it was unconstitutionally vague and imposed
content-based restrictions on protected speech.39 Essentially, they
argued that the subjectivity of the selection process permits the
35. SeeFinley, 118 S. Ct. at 2178 (quoting 20 U.S.C.A. § 954(d)). 20 U.S.C.A. §
954(d) provides:
No payment shall be made under this section except upon application
therefor which is submitted to the National Endowment for the Arts in
accordance with regulations issued and procedures established by the
Chairperson. In establishing such regulations and procedure, the Chair-
person shall ensure that (1) artistic excellence and artistic merit are the
criteria by which applications are judged, taking into consideration gen-
eral standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of
the American Public; and (2) applications are consistent with the pur-
poses of this section. Such regulations and procedures shall clearly indi-
cate that obscenity is without artistic merit, is not protected speech, and
shall not be funded. Projects, productions, workshops, and programs
that are determined to be obscene are prohibited from receiving finan-
cial assistance under this subchapter from the National Endowment for
the Arts. The disapproval or approval of an application by the Chairper-
son shall not be construed to mean, and shall not be considered as evi-
dence that, the project, production, workshop, or program for which the
applicant requested financial assistance is or is not obscene.
20 U.S.C.A. § 954(d).
36. Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2179.
37. See id. at 2174. The artists applied for their grants from the NEA prior to
enactment of the amendment. See id. Initially, their applications were recom-
mended for approval. See id Their applications were, however, rejected in June
1990 following promulgation of this amendment. See id.
38. See Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457 (C.D.
Cal. 1992).
39. See id. at 1460.
1999] 1069
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agency to engage in viewpoint-based discrimination and thereby re-
ject applications involving artistic speech that may be outside the
mainstream values or standards of decency. The district court• , . .41
granted Finley's motion for summary judgment noting that sec-
tion 954(d) (1), which requires the NEA to "take into consideration
general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and
values of the American public," 42 violated plaintiffs' due process and
free speech rights.
4
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the "decency and re-
spect" provision is unconstitutionally vague because it "is not sus-
ceptible to objective definition" and therefore is a potential in-
strument of arbitrary discrimination. 4  Because the government
failed to provide compelling justification for section 954(d) (1), the
court found that provision violated the First Amendment.45 The
Supreme Court concluded otherwise. 46
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor noted that the pro-
vision neither discriminates based on viewpoint nor is impermissi-
47bly vague. Rejecting the claim that section 954(d) (1) unconstitu-
tionally prohibits the agency from considering funding a specific
class of speech, the Court observed that the provision is not an ab-
solute ban on funding offensive or questionable forms of artistic
expression.4 Rather, the language of the provision is merely advi-
sory, "imposes no categorical requirement"49 and does not conclu-
sively preclude funding for projects that might be indecent or dis-
respectful.5 "Section 954(d) (1) simply adds considerations to the
grant-making process.
51
The Court further noted that the legislative history surround-
ing the promulgation of the amendment is inconsistent with the
plaintiffs' argument that its express intent was to prohibit certain
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. 20 U.S.C.A. § 954(d)(1) (West Supp. 1998).
43. See Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1459.
44. Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 680-81 (9th Cir.
1996).
45. See id.
46. See Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2179
(1998).
47. See id. at 2180.
48. See id. at 2176.
49. Id. at 2175.
50. See id.
51. Id.
1070 [Vol. 25
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52
forms of speech based on content. Rather, the resulting amend-
ment is a bipartisan "counterweight" to proposed legislation aimed
at eliminating the NEA's funding altogether." The Court further
observed that in situations where the legislative intent was to pro-
hibit funding for certain forms of speech, Congress had "done so in
no uncertain terms."
54
The Court also noted that any content-based criteria employed
in the decision-making process is simply a consequence of the in-
herently subjective nature of arts funding.55 Clearly, with finite re-
sources, it is "impossible to have a highly selective grant program
without denying money to a large amount of constitutionally pro-
tected expression.
56
Rejecting the assertion that the language of the statute is
impermissibly vague, the Court nevertheless conceded that the
terms of the provision are "opaque., 57 In the context of federal
funding of the arts, however, an applicant's compulsion to conform
their speech to fit the provision's criteria in order to obtain fund-
ing does not involve the same coercive effect as a threat of criminal
sanctions. 58 However, "when the Government is acting as a patron
rather than as sovereign, the consequences of imprecision are not
constitutionally severe."59
The Court noted that if the provision in question were in fact
unconstitutionally vague, then so too are all other government
programs that award grants and scholarships based entirely on sub-
jective criteria. The Court concluded that the statute does noth-
ing more than "add[] imprecise considerations to an already sub-
jective selection process.
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia parted with the ma-
62jority's characterization of the provision as merely hortatory.
52. Seeid. at2176.
53. See id.
54. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C.A. § 954(6) (2), which states that obscenity is without
artistic merit, is not protected speech, and shall not be funded).
55. See id. at 2177.
56. Id. at 2178.
57. Id. at 2179. The Court suggested that if the language in question were to
appear in a criminal statute or regulatory scheme, it could raise "substantial
vagueness concerns." Id.
58. See id.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 2179.
61. Id. at 2180.
62. See id.
1999] 1071
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Such an interpretation "guts" and "emasculates" the purpose of the
provision. The statute simply "means what it says": that all a ?pli-
cations must be judged by content and viewpoint-based criteria.
Rejecting the relevance of the majority's citation of the legisla-
tive history surrounding the promulgation of the provision,66 Scalia
focused on the text of the statute itself.67 Justice Scalia felt that the
statute was clearly intended to disfavor and discriminate against ar-
tistic expression that violates American values of decency and re-
spect.68 Yet, the provision does not abridge or curtail artistic ex-
pression that is repugnant to or inconsistent with American values,
because those who wish to produce such work are no less free to do
so. 69 The provision merely provides that taxpayers need not pay for
it and the government need not fund it.7° "And that," asserts Scalia,
"is perfectly constitutional."
7
1
C. Due Process and Equal Protection
In a case of first impression, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in
State v. Mitchell,7 ruled that it is not a violation of the Minnesota
Constitution to impose a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment,
with a minimum of thirty-years, upon a fifteen-year old child con-73
victed of first-degree murder. Reversing the court of appeals, the
court held that the punishment is neither cruel nor unusual, and
does not infringe upon an individual's rights to due process and
equal protection.
After school on November 17, 1994, fifteen-year old Eric Wil-
liam Mitchell gathered with friends at the apartment of Jeffery
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2180.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 2182. Scalia noted, "It matters not whether this enactment was
the product of the most partisan alignment in history or whether, upon its pas-
sage, the Members all linked arms and sang, the more we get together, the hap-
pier we'll be." Id.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 2182.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 2183.
71. Id. at 2180.
72. 577 N.W.2d 481 (Minn. 1998).
73. See id. at 481. The court noted that neither the Minnesota Supreme
Court nor the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the specific issue of the constitu-
tionality of sentencing a fifteen-year old child to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole for a minimum of thirty years. See id. at 488.
74. See id. at 492.
1072 [Vol. 25
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Meidl in Hutchinson, Minnesota.75 In need of money, the boys
formulated a plan to rob the Food and Fuel convenience store.
That evening, at approximately nine-thirty, Mitchell entered the77
store and approached the counter where nineteen-year old
Mickey Wilfert was working as a clerk.78 In spite of Wilfert's com-
pliance, Mitchell shot him in the face.79 Mitchell then walked be-
hind the counter and again pointed the gun in Wilfert's face and
80
kicked him as he lay on the floor. Mitchell took the money from
the cash register and ran from the store." At approximately ten-
thirty that evening, Mickey Wilfert died from a gunshot wound to
the head.8
Mitchell and his accomplice were arrested approximately four
hours after the murder and taken to the Sibley County Sheriffs
Department.83 The Couny charged Mitchell with the first-degree
murder of Mickey Wilfert.s
A reference hearing was held in February of 1995 after which
the juvenile court granted the county attorney's motion for referral
to adult district court.85 A jury convicted Mitchell on one count of
first-degree murder, one count of second-degree murder and one
86 87
count of aggravated robbery. Following a sentencing hearing,Mitchell was sentenced to the mandatory term of life imprisonment
75. See id. at 483.
76. See id.
77. See id. Mitchell was accompanied in the robbery by an accomplice, seven-
teen-year old Harley Hildenbrand. See id. The entire robbery was captured on
video by the store's security camera. See id.
78. See id. at 484.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id. Mitchell's wallet contained his identification, fell from his pocket
during the course of the robbery, and was recovered by police. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id. Mitchell appealed the juvenile court's referral to adult district
court. See id. Affirming the order, the court of appeals found that the evidence
sufficiently supported the juvenile court's finding that Mitchell was not "suitable
for treatment within the juvenile system and that public safety would not be served
under the juvenile court provisions." Id.
86. See id. at 486.
87. See id. Under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant con-
victed of first-degree murder receives a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment,
without the possibility of parole for a minimum of thirty years. See MINN.
SENTENCING GUIELINEs GRID (1998); MINN. STAT. § 244.05, subd. 4 (1998). The
trial judge, therefore, had no sentencing discretion. Notwithstanding this fact, the
court granted defense counsel's request for a sentencing hearing. See id.
1999) 1073
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without possibility of parole for a minimum of thirty years. 8
On appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, Mitchell asserted
that his sentence constituted a violation of his rights against cruel
or unusual punishment prohibited by the Minnesota Constitution.8 '
Whether a form of punishment is cruel or unusual requires consid-
eration of whether the punishment violates the "evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of maturing society."90  In its
analysis, the court considered evidence suggesting that the public
was becoming increasingly intolerant of child crime and more tol-• 91
erant of harsher penalties. Similarly, the fact that numerous states
imposed similar penalties on fifteen-year old children indicated
92that the punishment was also not unusual. Therefore, the court
found that a life sentence for a fifteen-year old child convicted of
first-degree murder is neither offensive to society's evolving stan-
dards of decency nor abhorrent to the community. 93  Thus,
Mitchell's sentence was not cruel or unusual.
94
Mitchell also argued that both the disparity in punishment be-
tween adults and children convicted of first-degree murder and the
district court's preclusion from considering age in sentencing
amounted to a violation of his substantive and procedural due pro-
cess rights.95 The court observed, however, that one does not have
a fundamental right to either a juvenile proceeding or to have age
considered in sentencing. 96 Expressing a degree of concern that
the legislature chose not to provide for intermediate sentencing for
children in Mitchell's position, the court nonetheless noted that
the district court simply does not have the authority to deviate from
the mandatory sentence.97 Furthermore, because the judge at the
88. See Mitchell, 577 N.W.2d at 488.
89. See id. at 488; see also MINN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (noting that excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punish-
ments inflicted).
90. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
91. See Mitchell, 577 N.W.2d. at 488.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 491.
96. See id.; see also State v. Behl, 564 N.W.2d 560, 562 (Minn. 1997) (holding
that automatic certification of a sixteen-year old indicted for murder without a
hearing did not violate substantive due process); State v. Walker, 306 Minn. 105,
108, 235 N.W.2d 810, 813 (1975) (holding that a mandatory life sentence for first-
degree murder is not a violation of substantive due process notwithstanding the
district court's statutory preclusion from considering mitigating factors).
97. See Mitchell, 577 N.W.2d at 491.
1074 [Vol. 25
10
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss3/9
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
juvenile certification hearing is required to consider the "totality of
the circumstances, including the sophistication and maturity of the
child."98 Mitchell's age was considered in the certification deci-
sion.99 Therefore, Mitchell had not been deprived of his right to
procedural due process of law.100
Sharing in the district court judge's articulated dismay at the
inability to deviate from the sentencing guidelines and the ability to
"treat children differently,"10' the court nonetheless reiterated that
it is a matter for the legislature to establish the severity of criminalS 102
sanctions. It is clear, however, that the court was sending a mes-
sage to the legislature that a "middle ground" sentencing alterna-
tive would provide courts with the necessary and "preferable" dis-
cretion to prevent potentially unjust sentencing.10  As it stands,
however, once the juvenile system waives jurisdiction by referring
the matter to adult district court, it is to be adjudicated as though
juvenile jurisdiction never attached.1°4 The sentencing guidelines,
the court added, provide that sentences are to be applied with the
same presumptive force to a child certified as an adult as any other
adult convicted of that crime.'
Adam D. Rosenfield
98. MINN. R.Juv. P. 32.05.
99. See Mitchell 577 N.W.2d at 492.
100. See id.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 488.
103. See id. at 491.
104. See id. at 489.
105. See id.
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